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Abstract—In highly open systems like the Internet, attribute-
based access control (ABAC) has proven its appropriateness.
This is reflected in the utilization of ABAC in authentication and
authorization infrastructures (AAIs). However, specification and
maintenance of ABAC policies has turned out to be complex
and error-prone even in federations of limited size, especially
if heterogeneous attribute schemes are involved. Here, the
arising Semantic Web can contribute to a solution. This paper
describes an architecture for embedding the access control
process into a semantic context employing external knowledge
in form of ontologies. We base our proposal on extensions
of established open standards. Using the approach presented,
policy management at the different sites of a federation is
simplified by a semantic attribute management facility.
Index Terms—Security, attribute-based access control,
authorization and authentication infrastructures, attribute
management, semantic web, ontologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the growing use of the Internet, more and more
critical processes are run over the Web. Examples are e-
government or e-commerce applications, or solutions within
large organizations like enterprise portals. These have to be
protected from unauthorized access in an adequate manner,
e.g., commercial information services should be accessible
only by paying customers. So far, models like role-based
access control (RBAC) [1] were used in such environments.
Based on “Supporting Attribute-based Access Control with Ontolo-
gies”, by Torsten Priebe, Wolfgang Dobmeier, and Nora Kamprath
which appeared in the Proceedings of the First International Confer-
ence on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2006), Vienna,
Austria, April 2006. c© 2006 IEEE.
These approaches have deficiencies in large open systems,
where the number of potential users is very high and most
users will not be known beforehand. As the RBAC model
is not flexible enough to deal with these requirements, the
use of attribute-based technologies (ABAC) [2], [3], [4] has
been introduced, e.g., within the eXtensible Access Con-
trol Markup Language (XACML) standard [5]. However, the
higher flexibility of attribute-based approaches comes along
with higher complexity in the specification and maintenance
of the policies. Policy administrators need to be aware of the
attribute scheme used by the issuer of a specific attribute,
who in many cases may reside in a different organization.
The attributes a user possesses do not necessarily match those
used by the developers of a web-based information system or
service.
Besides, infrastructures have been developed supporting
the exchange of security information and user attributes as
well as performing authorization and authentication tasks in
federations; we call these infrastructures authentication and
authorization infrastructures (AAIs). Among the solutions in
use, the best known ones are Liberty’s ID-FF, Internet2’s Shib-
boleth, and Microsoft’s .NET Passport. Parties like enterprises
and e-commerce vendors can use AAIs to form federations
and share user and security information for authentication
and authorization purposes like it has been shown in [14].
Being part of such a federation in connection makes policy
management even more difficult.
We use an example from e-commerce to illustrate this. A
video-on-demand store could represent adult customers by an
attribute “fullAge” in his access control policy. Furthermore, a
book vendor who is part of the same federation could describe
adult customers using the attribute “age”. On the other hand,
a potential customer might try to prove these properties by
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Figure 1. Sample e-commerce scenario
providing a driver’s license (“hasDriversLicense”) which can
be valid for many countries. This scenario is depicted in Fig.
1.
In classic attribute-based approaches the policy admin-
istrators at the different sites have to consider this situa-
tion already in advance, which significantly complicates the
management of ABAC policies. On the other hand, if the
different organizations restrict themselves to a common set
of standardized attributes, this would happen at the price of
a low expressiveness for the representation of subjects and
objects, thus losing some of the advantages of the flexible and
dynamic ABAC functionality.
In this paper, we propose a solution to these issues. With the
background of a more and more developing Semantic Web, we
propose to put user, resource, and environment attributes into
a semantic context as it has been initially described in [6]; this
will simplify the specification and maintenance of policies. We
then transfer this solution into an AAI scenario, showing how
our proposal can be incorporated into current AAI protocols.
As the Internet is the main application area of our approach,
we build upon standards like XACML [5], RDF [7], and OWL
[8].
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we
introduce the concepts of attribute-based access control and
XACML in more detail. Section III describes authentication
and authorization infrastructures, while section IV presents
basics of the Semantic Web. In section V we propose an
extension to the XACML architecture that allows easier policy
specification by introducing the use of ontologies and then
apply it to a generic AAI scenario. A prototype implementa-
tion is covered in section VI. An in-depth discussion of our
approach is given in section VII. In section VIII, a description
of related approaches found in the literature follows. Section
IX concludes the paper and discusses possible future work.
II. ATTRIBUTE-BASED AUTHORIZATION AND ACCESS
CONTROL
The basic idea of attribute-based access control (ABAC)
[2], [3] is not to define permissions directly between subjects
and objects, but instead to use their attributes as the basis for
authorizations. For subjects, attributes can be static ones like
Subject
Descriptors
Object 
Descriptors
Opera-
tions
Permissions
Authorizations
Subjects Objects
Subject
Attributes
Object 
Attributes
Figure 2. Overview of the ABAC model
a subject’s name, or position or role in a company. However,
dynamic attributes like age, current location or an acquired
subscription for a digital library can be used as well. For
objects, metadata properties, e.g., the subject of a document,
can be used. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Subjects and objects are both represented by a set of at-
tributes and related attribute values. Permissions consist of the
combination of a so-called object descriptor, which consists of
a set of attributes and conditions like “age > 18” or “subscribed
= true”, and an operation that is to be executed on the objects
denoted by the descriptor. Authorizations are defined between
a subject descriptor and a permission. Using descriptors it is
possible to dynamically assign permissions to subjects and
objects, thus making a manual assignment superfluous.
In addition, authorizations can be extended with additional
conditions, e.g., for comparing subject attributes with object
attributes (without conditions, attributes can only be compared
with constant values). Environment attributes like time of
day can also be considered for the access control decision.
Furthermore, it has been shown that traditional access control
models like discretionary, mandatory, and role-based access
control can be mapped to ABAC concepts. [3]
As described in the introduction, we argue that policy
specification for ABAC-like authorization models is complex
and error-prone. It can be simplified by introducing semantic
inference at the point of the access control decision. For this
purpose we extend the open and widely accepted XACML
standard [5]. XACML defines a generic authorization archi-
tecture as well as an XML dialect for specifying attribute-
based access control policies. It is well-suited for our purposes
because all relevant aspects of the introduced ABAC model
can be represented.
A XACML authorization architecture consists of several
logical components. First of all, a reference monitor concept
is used to intercept access requests. This component is called
a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). A PEP transmits access
requests to a Policy Decision Point (PDP) for retrieval and
evaluation of applicable policies. Policies are specified and
stored in Policy Administration Points (PAPs). In case a PDP
needs attributes of subjects, objects, or the environment that
are missing in the original request, Policy Information Points
3(PIPs) deliver the data needed for evaluation. As in general not
all of these components will use the same message format for
communication, a Context Handler is employed as a mediator.
After evaluation, the result is sent back to the requester and is
enforced at the PEP. One or more obligations can be executed
then, e.g. creating a log entry or sending an email.
As mentioned, the XACML specification furthermore pro-
vides a policy language and a request/response language. The
request/response language defines the declaration of access
control requests for a specific object and responses to these
requests. The policy language is based on three main elements:
PolicySet, Policy, and Rule. A PolicySet can contain a set
of single policies or another PolicySet. Policies consist of
single Rules which have a Condition, an Effect, and a Target.
Conditions can be used beyond the Target to further specify
the applicability of a Rule using predicates, while Effects
denote the result of a Rule, e.g. permit or deny. To find the
relevant policy for an access control request, every PolicySet,
Policy, and rule has a Target, which is evaluated at the time
of access request. A Target consists of a specification of
sets of subjects, objects, operations, and environments using
their respective attributes which can be evaluated with match
functions. When the relevant Policies and Rules are found,
they are evaluated independently of each other; contradicting
evaluation results can be resolved using rule- as well as policy-
combining algorithms.
III. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION
INFRASTRUCTURES
Service providers on the Internet are familiar with infras-
tructures providing basic security services. Authentication and
authorization infrastructures (AAIs) have started with basic
single sign-on functionality and are nowadays also able to
manage the authorization process and access control deci-
sions. Two main architectures can be found: central ones like
Microsoft’s .NET Passport solution1 or federated ones like
Liberty’s Identity Federation Framework (Liberty ID-FF)2 or
Internet2’s Shibboleth3.
Traditionally, AAIs consist of one or more identity provider
(IdP), authenticating users, numerous service providers (SP),
offering their services backed by the AAI, and potentially
additional AAI providers, contributing services like storage,
certificate management, auditing, and likewise. Centrally or-
ganized AAIs usually rely on a third party provider that offers
his security service to SPs (MS Passport approach). In a
federation, SPs are joining together, trying to exploit synergies.
Each federation member offers services to the others (Liberty
ID-FF approach).
AAIs help sharing security information about subjects and
objects with other service providers or central services. Such
information could be for example an assertion about the
user’s correct and traceable identification. Additionally, trusted
sources can provide profile information like user attributes.
Using these attributes an access control model like ABAC
1http://www.passport.net
2http://www.projectliberty.org
3http://shibboleth.internet2.edu
Figure 3. Security services including an attribute infrastructure
(e.g., using XACML) can decide on the user’s rights. Fig. 3
shows the process of granting access to resources with the help
of user and resource attributes. Attributes can contain identity
and profile information. An AAI takes over various elements of
the shown security services. E.g., if the infrastructure federates
the user authentication the result is a single sign-on (SSO) for
the user.
A special benefit of AAIs lies in the accumulated user data
over a federation: user profiles, buying patterns, and earned
privileges. Identities could be transferred from one service
provider to another making it possible to always use up-to-
date address data or prove a good reputation acquired at one
federation member. The exchange of attributes can be done
via the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). As
an open standard it is predetermined to form the underlying
communication technology for every open AAI approach.
Its potential to sign, encrypt, and communicate any kind of
attributes builds also the basis for XACML decisions. SAML
tokens can be transferred via multiple means; HTTP Post-
requests and Web Services are the prevailing forms.
All AAI solutions analyzed have SSO functionality in
common. However, neither of them is able to provide attribute-
based access control. At most, attribute exchange is supported.
The implementation of SAML within Liberty’s ID-FF and
Shibboleth is exemplary for an open AAI.
Including ABAC functionality and an attribute infrastructure
into AAIs normally leads to the restriction or centralization of
attributes. The heterogeneity of user information at each fed-
eration member can only be solved by a centrally maintained
database containing all attributes and XACML policies or via
a limited, common set of attributes. The centralized approach
has been discussed in [9].
In a generic AAI with centralized attribute management the
communication steps are as shown in Fig. 4. In step 1 the user
requests the resource he desires from any service provider
(SP). As the SP has delegated the security services to the
AAI the user is referred to a central AAI server requesting an
access control decision for the specific resource. First, the AAI
authenticates the user appropriately (step 3). Once the user
is identified the AAI collects his attributes from the central
database and uses the access policy to decide on the request
(steps 4-6). The policy decision is referred to the SP which
enforces the decision. After the transaction the SP can update
the customer’s attributes if necessary. Please note that the user
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Figure 4. ABAC enabled AAI with centralized attribute management
Figure 5. Layers of the Semantic Web
data is not stored at the SP but at a central AAI facility.
Furthermore, all federation members need to use the same
attribute format and information.
IV. ONTOLOGIES AND SEMANTIC WEB TECHNOLOGIES
In 1998, Tim Berners-Lee presented his roadmap towards
the Semantic Web [10]. His main idea was to enrich the
human-readable information on the Web with metadata with
precise semantics. A standardized metadata model, a stan-
dardized syntax, and the possibility to define a standardized
vocabulary (a so-called ontology) was needed. Fig. 5 shows an
often used diagram which presents the technologies developed
within the Semantic Web initiative of the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C)4 as a layer model.
Resources on the Semantic Web contain metadata. Using
an XML syntax, this metadata is encoded using the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) [7] as the language for the
description of resources and RDF Schema (RDFS) [11] for
the definition of the metadata schema. RDFS is based on
a class concept and inheritance and already features simple
constructs for describing ontologies. An ontology is capable
of describing concepts, e.g., persons that exist in a certain
domain and relationships among them. These concepts can
then also be used as a vocabulary for the metadata of resources.
The standard for describing ontologies on the Semantic Web
is the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [8], supporting richer
semantics on top of RDFS. The processing and analysis of
4http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/
ontologies, i.e. drawing conclusions and gaining new infor-
mation through combination, takes place in the logical layer.
Implicit information in the data can be made explicit by using
so-called reasoners or inference engines. Simple inferences are
already possible with RDFS and OWL, for instance through
inheritance. More complex custom inference rules require the
usage of a special rule language. A promising approach based
on the Rule Markup Language (RuleML) is the Semantic Web
Rule Language (SWRL) [12].
Meanwhile integrated tools for managing RDF(S) and OWL
data are available (e.g., Jena5 and Sesame6). Besides persistent
storage, they also provide simple inference capabilities as well
as query languages like SPARQL [13]. The remaining layers of
the Semantic Web, particularly proof and trust, are so far still
much of a field of research. The approach for ontology-based
authorization and access control presented in the following
section is based on the standards OWL, SWRL and SPARQL.
V. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section we introduce our proposal for putting the
access control process into a semantic context by utilization
of knowledge encoded in an ontology. The description is split
into two parts. First, we present the core of our approach which
extends the process of gathering user attributes in XACML
by attributes which are inferred employing Semantic Web
technologies. Second, we embed this extension into a generic
AAI architecture; the goal is to facilitate policy specification
in a defined federation of sites by deploying our attribute
management facility.
A. Basic Approach
For the attribute-based access control techniques at hand,
e.g., XACML, all user attributes and conditions to be checked
(e.g., “age > 18”) must be encoded statically in the pol-
icy. Actually, only the conditions necessary from the system
designer’s point of view (e.g., “fullAge = true”) should be
relevant when specifying the policies. It is rather a question
of attribute management how a user can prove this property.
Our approach achieves this by extending the architecture
defined in the XACML specification [5] with Semantic Web
techniques. Mappings between different attributes and attribute
conditions are performed by an ontology-based inference
engine. The extended XACML architecture is depicted in Fig.
6. Our extensions are emphasized using gray shading and bold
labels.
An access control decision and enforcement is now per-
formed according to the following steps:
1) The PAP provides a XACML policy, which has been cre-
ated beforehand by a security administrator, to the PDP.
Fig. 12 at the end of this paper shows an example for
such a policy. In our example, we assume users have to
be adult when requesting read access to resources below
http://www.example.org/restricted/.
2) The user (access requester) sends a resource
request to the policy enforcement point, e.g., for
5http://jena.sourceforge.net
6http://www.openrdf.org
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Figure 6. Extended XACML architecture
http://www.example.org/restricted/
index.html.
3) The PEP forwards this request (which may already
contain user, resource, and environment attributes) to the
context handler. It is assumed that the user is identified
by his email address user@example.org and that he
has included an “age” attribute.
4) The context handler creates a XACML request and sends
it to the PDP.
5) In case the PDP needs additional subject, resource,
and environment attributes, they are requested from the
context handler. In this example, the PDP is in need of
the attribute “fullAge”.
6) The context handler requests those attributes from a
policy information point.
7) The PIP collects the requested attributes, if possible,
from the subject, resource, and environment. In this case,
there is no possibility to acquire the attribute “fullAge”
from the user.
8) The PIP delivers the attributes back to the context
handler.
9) So far, the procedure was exactly as specified in the
XACML standard. If some attributes requested by the
PDP still are missing, we propose to try to deduce them
from the ones included in the request and supplied
by the PIP, utilizing Semantic Web technologies. The
attributes are sent to an inference engine (step 9a).
The inference engine combines the attributes with an
ontology delivered by an ontology administration point
(OAP). Fig. 13 at the end of this paper shows a sample
ontology in OWL/XML syntax. The example includes a
declaration that the attribute “fullAge” is derived from
“hasDriversLicense” (i.e. everyone who has a driver’s
license is of full age) and an SWRL rule that defines
full age depending on the “age” attribute:
Subject(?x) ∧ age(?x, ?a) ∧
greaterThanOrEqual(?a, 18)
⇒ fullAge(?x, true)
The derived attributes can then be queried by the
context handler with a SPARQL request using the
DESCRIBE command (step 9b), for instance:
DESCRIBE <mailto:user@example.org>
The inference engine delivers the complete set of
attributes as shown in Fig. 7 (step 9c); the derived
attribute “fullAge” is shown boldly.
10) The further processing again corresponds to the XACML
specification . Optionally, the context handler attaches
the resource itself to the request.
11) The extended request is sent to the PDP. Fig. 8 shows
the complete sample request (with derived attributes) in
6<?xml version="1.0"?>
<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context">
<Subject>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"
DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:data-type:rfc822Name">
<AttributeValue>user@example.org</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:example:age" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">
<AttributeValue>30</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:example:fullAge" DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean">
<AttributeValue>true</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Subject>
<Resource>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>http://www.example.org/restricted/index.html</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Resource>
<Action>
<Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
<AttributeValue>read</AttributeValue>
</Attribute>
</Action>
</Request>
Figure 8. Extended request context in XACML
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=
"http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#">
<Subject
xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:context:"
rdf:about="mailto:anonymous@anonymous.org">
<age xmlns="urn:example:" rdf:datatype=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"
>30</age>
<fullAge xmlns="urn:example:" rdf:datatype=
"http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"
>true</age>
</Subject>
...
</rdf:RDF>
Figure 7. Extended subject attribute set in RDF/XML
XACML syntax. The derived attribute “fullAge” is again
shown in bold.
12) The PDP evaluates the policy and sends the response
context (including the access control decision) back to
the context handler.
13) The context handler translates the response context back
to the native format of the PEP and forwards it.
14) The PEP satisfies possible obligations.
15) (Not shown) If access is granted, the PEP allows access
to the resource. Otherwise, access is refused.
B. Embedding the Extension Into a Generic AAI Architecture
Including our proposal into the presented AAI leads to an
extension of the introduced service chain as shown in Fig. 9.
After retrieving attributes and policy the proposed inference
Figure 9. Security services enhanced with attribute inference engine
engine needs to be contacted. The engine is able to deduce
new attributes or map attributes from different providers. As
already explained, user attributes now can be maintained,
stored, and formatted to every federation member’s liking. This
enables a flexible and dynamic attribute exchange in an open
federation. With the semantic mapping of user information the
need for a centralised managed repository evaporates.
In [14] we have shown a generic architecture for a dis-
tributed AAI making use of distributed identity providers (IdP)
as used in Shibboleth or Liberty and one or more PDPs
responsible for collecting attributes and computing a policy
decision. So far the potential attributes to use needed to be
specified centrally for each federation leading to the already
given drawbacks.
Using the proposed XACML enhancements these limita-
tions can be avoided. The result of a distributed AAI with
included ontology administration point (OAP) and inference
mechanism is shown in Fig. 10.
We made use of the main elements of Liberty ID-FF 1.1,
namely distributed identity and service providers, and used
7Figure 10. ABAC-enabled AAI with inferred attributes
SAML 1.0. The first step of the access control decision, the
authentication, is handled as defined by the Liberty ID-FF
protocol. In addition to these parties we introduce the XACML
elements policy information point (PIP), policy administration
point (PAP), policy decision point (PDP), policy enforce-
ment point (PEP), the described ontology administration point
(OAP), and inference engine (IEng). As the XACML standard
is very imprecise about the PIP and the communication be-
tween other XACML elements and the PIP we decided on us-
ing the PIP concept mainly as an interface to relevant databases
and a transformation tool of information and attributes into
SAML. The originally proposed context handler has been
substituted by this functionality. The sequence diagram in Fig.
10 is based on the the UML 2.0 sequence diagram notation
using SAML and XACML nomenclature.
Access control decision and enforcement is now performed
according to the following steps:
1) When the user tries to access a resource he is referred to
his IdP. The IdP is derived either from a cookie stored in
the user’s browser or the user chooses from a list. This
is the standard Liberty ID-FF SSO procedure. The SP
(SP-1 in Fig. 4) sends the IdP a SAML authentication
request. Additionally, he sends a XACML authorization
decision request.
2) After the user’s authentication, the IdP’s PIP component
collects the available attributes. He asks every federation
member with a SAML request if attributes are available.
The service providers’ PIPs provide the IdP with SAML
AttributeStatements.
3) After the IdP’s PIP has collected all attributes, an access
control decision request is sent to the PDP with an iden-
tifier of the requested resource and all user attributes.
The PDP’s PIP will collect resource and environment
attributes.
4) In accordance with step 9 explained in section V-A the
PDP will try to deduce attributes from the information at
hand. The user attributes are sent to the inference engine
together with a SPARQL DESCRIBE request for further
information. Using the given ontology from the OAP,
the inference engine processes attributes and ontology
and replies with a SAML AttributeStatement containing
newly derived information.
5) The access control decision is computed using the
loaded policies. It is now possible to use fine grained
access control policies due to the expressiveness and
completeness of available attribute information. The
decision is sent back to the requesting entity, the IdP.
The SAML authentication statement and the XACML
authorization decision statement are referred back to
the SP. Finally, a local PEP at the SP will enforce the
decision.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
In order to evaluate our proposal, we have implemented
a prototype that follows the architecture presented in the
previous section with minor simplifications. As the source of
8the attributes is irrelevant for their further processing, we did
not use a policy information point (PIP). Instead we assume
that all available attributes are already included in the request.
Also, the actual resource and a policy enforcement point (PEP)
are omitted in our test scenario. Hence, the original request is
already in XACML format, rather than having a native PEP
request. Furthermore, we do not consider obligations in our
prototype because they are not associated with the attribute
management, either.
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Figure 11. Architecture of the basic prototype implementation
The architecture of our prototype implementation is de-
picted in Fig. 11. The access control decision procedure is
similar to section V. After having received a XACML request,
the context handler extracts the attributes from the request,
reproduces them in RDF and hands them over to the inference
engine. For this purpose, we chose Jena by Hewlett Packard7
because it provides a framework for Semantic Web applica-
tions with persistent storage, RDF/OWL-support and SPARQL
querying. Unfortunately, in the version we used (version 2.2)
Jena does not support custom rules using SWRL. However,
deduction is possible via inheritance or OWL constructs like
“owl:equivalentProperty” and “owl:sameAs”. The complete
(extended) attribute set is requested by the context handler
from Jena using SPARQL and incorporated into the XACML
request. We use the XACML reference implementation by Sun
Microsystems8 (version 1.2) as the PDP.
In parallel we have developed a prototype AAI based on
the Liberty ID-FF 1.1 specification and integrated the Sun
XACML reference implementation into the system. We are
currently in the process of also integrating Jena and our
extension as well in order to evaluate our approach in an AAI
setting.
7http://jena.sourceforge.net
8http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net
VII. DISCUSSION
In the following, we discuss our approach in terms of per-
formance, ontology and policy specification, and AAI aspects.
A. Performance
A performance evaluation of our semantic extension in
comparison to a base XACML implementation was not done
because of the multitude of other reasoners (e.g., RacerPro9,
Pellet10, and Bossam11) available besides Jena. These reason-
ers possess a varying functional extent, e.g. Jena and Bossam
have only partial reasoning support for the description logic
variant of OWL, while Pellet and Racer have full support,
yet only Pellet is sound and complete. On the other hand,
Pellet and Jena do not support rules in SWRL while RacerPro
and Bossam do, but only in fragments. It is because of these
differences that a performance evaluation is not yet feasible.
What is evident is that the time needed for an access control
decision depends on the performance of base XACML im-
plementation, the performance of deployed inference engine,
and the complexity of ontology used, which with increasing
complexity can lead to serious performance loss.
Naturally, the performance of the access control decision in
an AAI heavily relies on the performance of our XACML
extension. However, time and resources needed to collect
attributes over the network from various service providers is
far more costly.
B. Ontology and Policy Specification
At first sight it might seem that the simplified policy
management has been traded for a rather complicated on-
tology/attribute management. However, with the further de-
velopment of the Semantic Web in various areas, it can be
expected that more and more pre-built ontologies will become
available. These can be provided by corporate, national, or
even international organizations, but also by software vendors
that employ attribute-based access control technology. Policy
administrators will be able to reuse such ontologies for differ-
ent authorization scenarios. Hence, the ontology has to be built
only once. We also expect that the widespread use of XACML
will ensure the availability of powerful and easy-to-use policy
editors.
However, there are some subtleties in ontology specification
that have to be taken into account. One of the main issues lies
in possible different interpretations of the knowledge base;
one can reason on implicit knowledge encoded in an ontology
according to the open world assumption (OWA) or the closed
world assumption (CWA). These assumptions differ in their
respective views of completeness of the information contained
in a knowledge base. In OWA statements not existing in the
knowledge base are considered as unknown, while in CWA
they are considered as false. The OWA, which is standard
to RDF/OWL reasoning, has advantages when dealing with
9http://www.racer-systems.com
10http://www.mindswap.org/2003/pellet
11http://projects.semwebcentral.org/projects/bossam
9heterogeneous descriptions of identical concepts in open sys-
tems. Yet, problems with specification of concepts can arise.
We refer the reader to [15] and [16] for an in-depth treatment
and solution sketches as these issues are out of the scope of
this paper.
C. AAI Aspects
We have shown a possible integration of our XACML
extensions and the inference engine into an AAI. As AAI
architectures differ tremendously the actual inclusion of the
new components can differ likewise. The given approach is
based on a distributed, decentralized federation. Here, the OAP
and the inference engine were included into the access control
decision point. The given architecture respects user privacy
and separates identity information from profile information.
The IdP is the only member in the federation actually knowing
the user’s identity. However, he is not aware of the resource
accessed. The access control decision point is only aware of
various attributes belonging to a pseudonym or any opaque
identifier. Additional, inferred attributes are connected only
with the pseudonym as well. The service provider is not
presented with the true identity of the user. The request for
attributes to a given identity is not connected with the original
request.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Comparative surveys on the functionality of existing AAIs
can be found in [17] and [18]. Katsikas et all [19] sum up
requirements in providing secure e-commerce.
As for employing Semantic Web technologies in the access
control decision and enforcement process, an early approach
has been presented by Yagüe et al. [20]. Their proposal defines
its own policy language on the basis of XML. It also allows
for dynamic instantiation, i.e. querying external XML and
RDF data sources for attribute values. A privilege management
infrastructure (PMI) can be used to issue subjects’ attribute
certificates for use in access control; each issuing party
produces semantic descriptions of the certificates it signs.
Metadata of objects is described in a custom XML format.
However, more powerful metadata representations like OWL
and reasoning capabilities are not provided.
Damiani et al. [21] propose an semantically enhanced
extension of XACML as well as a reference architecture for
policy enforcement. They extend XACML with an operator
to trigger requests for object metadata from a semantic en-
vironment. Subject metadata is used for the access control
decision as delivered by the requester. Damiani et al. use RDF
for specification of metadata, thus not providing the richness
of OWL. Furthermore, reasoning on subject metadata is not
possible.
Rei [22] employs an ontology to represent concepts like
rights and obligations relevant for a policy. Policies and rules
can be defined in RDFS or a Prolog-like language. As our aim
is to simplify attribute and policy management, we stick with
the established policy language XACML and extend it by the
use of OWL for attribute management.
Other approaches [23], [24], [25] use OWL instead of
XACML as basis for the representation of policies. In [24]
and [25] additionally SWRL is used to encode the knowledge
base as well as the authorization rules.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an approach for simplifying the specifi-
cation and maintenance of attribute-based access control poli-
cies by extending the attribute management with an ontology-
based inference facility. This enables policy administrators to
concentrate on the properties they deem necessary from their
point of view; they do not need to determine in advance
which attributes a subject may use to prove these proper-
ties. A semantic mapping between different attributes can
be performed in an ontology. This core proposal is based
on the established XACML standard and features thorough
use of open standards like RDF and OWL in the semantic
extension of the architecture. We then described how members
of federations in AAIs can benefit from our facility and
showed an integration into an AAI.
For future work, we plan to thoroughly evaluate the benefits
of the presented approach. As mentioned before we are
currently integrating our extensions in an AAI prototype and
evaluating it in this context. Furthermore, we are in the process
of developing a security infrastructure for an architecture based
on semantic web services in the area of e-government. This is
done in the context of the EU-funded project “Access-eGov”12
which aims at building semantic interoperability among e-
government services across organizational and regional bor-
ders. We also plan to provide ontologies for security interop-
eration which are appropriate for the presented approach.
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy"
PolicyId="SamplePolicy" RuleCombiningAlgId=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:rule-combining-algorithm:permit-overrides">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<AnySubject/>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<Resource>
<ResourceMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:regexp-string-match">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
>http://www.example.org/restricted/.*</AttributeValue>
<ResourceAttributeDesignator DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id"/>
</ResourceMatch>
</Resource>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<AnyAction/>
</Actions>
</Target>
<Rule RuleId="SampleRule" Effect="Permit">
<Target>
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<SubjectMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"
>true</AttributeValue>
<SubjectAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:example:fullAge"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"/>
</SubjectMatch>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resources>
<AnyResource/>
</Resources>
<Actions>
<Action>
<ActionMatch MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
<AttributeValue DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
>read</AttributeValue>
<ActionAttributeDesignator AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"/>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
</Actions>
</Rule>
...
</Policy>
Figure 12. Sample policy in XACML
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"
xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"
xmlns:swrl="http://www.w3.org/2003/11/swrl#">
<owl:Class rdf:about="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy:Subject"/>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="urn:example:age">
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#nonNegativeInteger"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy:Subject"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="urn:example:hasDriverLicense">
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy:Subject"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="urn:example:fullAge">
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy:Subject"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#FunctionalProperty"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="urn:example:hasDriverLicense"/>
</owl:DatatypeProperty>
<swrl:Variable rdf:ID="x"/>
<swrl:Variable rdf:ID="a"/>
<swrl:Imp>
<swrl:body rdf:parseType="Collection">
<swrl:ClassAtom>
<swrl:classPredicate rdf:resource="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:policy:Subject"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#x"/>
</swrl:ClassAtom>
<swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
<swrl:propertyPredicate rdf:resource="urn:example:age"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#x"/>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:resource="#a"/>
</swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
<swrl:BuiltinAtom>
<swrl:builtin rdf:resource="http://www.w3.org/2003/11/swrlb#greaterThanOrEqual"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#a"/>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer"
>18</rdf:argument2>
</swrl:BuiltinAtom>
</swrl:body>
<swrl:head rdf:parseType="Collection">
<swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
<swrl:propertyPredicate rdf:resource="urn:example:fullAge"/>
<swrl:argument1 rdf:resource="#x"/>
<swrl:argument2 rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean"
>true</swrl:argument2>
</swrl:DatavaluedPropertyAtom>
</swrl:head>
</swrl:Imp>
...
</rdf:RDF>
Figure 13. Sample ontology in OWL/XML
